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This paper discusses the arguments in favour of an International
Competition Policy Agreement (ICPA) within the WTO framework. We
argue that the only clear justification for an ICPA is in the presence of
cross-border policy spillovers in competition policy. However, it is shown
that such an agreement may lead both to a less competitive world trading
system and, more importantly, to a lower level of world welfare. While
recognizing the potential benefits that may arise from an ICPA, we
recommend a cautious approach that acknowledges these drawbacks and
other potential holes in such an agreement.
(JEL F13, L40)
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1. INTRODUCTION
The first regular biennial Ministerial meeting of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) held in Singapore in December 1996 gave birth to a
working group which will study the interaction between trade and
competition policies.
1 This was not the first time that the subject was
considered in the WTO/GATT.
2 Already in 1948, the Havana Charter for
the creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO) included a
Restrictive Business Practices chapter (Chapter V) whose objective was to
prevent business practices that restrain competition and adversely affect
international trade. However, the Havana Charter never entered into force
due to the refusal by the US Congress to ratify it, probably of its fear of
loosing some of its sovereignty (see Jackson, 1969).
The failure to create the ITO resulted into the incorporation of a ‘best-
endeavours’ clause in Article XXIX of the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs GATT to account for the agreement reached on Articles I to VI of
the Havana Charter. However, Article XXIX of GATT and other later
provisions (discussed below in section 2) are seen by some authors as
insufficient (see Matsushita,  1997). On the contrary, others argue that
reinterpretation of existing rules may suffice to ensure a fair-competitive
world trading system (see, for example, Bacchetta, Horn and Mavroidis,
1997.)
Those authors who see existing rules as insufficient often urge for
negotiations on an agreement on competition policy to be undertaken within
the WTO.  This is the approach supported for instance by the European
Union (EU). Several arguments are advanced. First, the on-going trade
liberalization through successive rounds of negotiations (and other
agreements such as the General Agreements on Trade and Services
(GATS)) implies that competition policy, as an instrument to restrict market
access, becomes more visible as traditional trade barriers vanish. Second, as
trade policy becomes constrained by WTO rules, governments may be
tempted to substitute trade restrictions by competition policy barriers to
trade. Third, conflicts over competition issues may trigger trade wars (as
could have been the case with the US-EU dispute over the Boeing-
                                                
1 The working group will have to report by the end of 1998 to the General Council of the
WTO.
2  Note that the WTO is not the only international forum on which the relation between
trade and competition policies are discussed. Developed countries have been discussing this
issue within the OECD and developing countries have pursued this topic within UNCTAD.
The advantage of the WTO over OECD and UNCTAD is that the former has an
enforcement mechanism through the dispute settlement process. This paper focuses
exclusively on the WTO.© EIPA
McDonnell Douglas merger).
3 More generally, this implies that to fully
capture gains from trade liberalization countries should also remove
impediments to trade induced by competition policy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief summary of
provisions against anti-competitive behaviour in WTO. Arguments for the
creation of an International Competition Policy Agreement (ICPA) are
discussed in section 3 where it is argued that the only robust case for an
ICPA is linked to the presence of competition policy spillovers (i.e., the
decision of a national competition policy authority affects rest-of-the-world
welfare).
However, as discussed in section 4, the case for an ICPA, based on
competition policy spillovers, would be damped by the difficulties that a
hasty implementation could entail. A major hurdle is that it is not clear how
large would be the gains and costs from such an agreement. Moreover, it is
difficult to determine, a priori, whether the creation of an ICPA would
result in a more or less competitive world, as shown in section 5. Besides, if
one introduces endogenous determination of competition policy into the
analysis, as we do in section 6, then the scope for such an agreement to
improve economic efficiency tends to shrink, as lobbying inherently gives a
second-best nature to any policy decision.
Finally, section 7 explores the costs of such an agreement within the WTO,
whereas section 8 provides some concluding remarks.
2.  PROVISIONS AGAINST ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR
IN WTO
This section focuses on provisions against anti-competitive behaviour in the
GATT and WTO framework.
4
                                                
3  As argued by Sir Leon Brittan: ‘I have long believed that we need an international
agreement on competition rules and smoother cooperation between national competition
jurisdictions. Otherwise there are bound to be more and more clashes when powerful
competition authorities seek to deal with the same case, applying different rules.’ (Financial
Times, 25/07/97).
4  The discussion below extensively relies on World Trade Organization (1997).© EIPA
2.1 A brief history
Provisions for restrictive business practices were first introduced in the
GATT through Article XXIX:1. This Article required contracting parties to
observe the general principles of Chapter V (among others) of the Havana
Charter while expecting ratification of the Havana Charter by all contracting
parties. The objective of Chapter V was to ‘prevent, on the part of private or
public commercial enterprises, business practices affecting international
trade which restraint competition, limit access to markets, or foster
monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the
expansion of production or trade...’. Deletion of Article XXIX of the GATT
was voted in 1955 when it became clear that the Havana Charter would not
enter into force,
5 and a working party considered proposals to include in the
GATT provisions along the lines of those of Chapter V of the Havana
Charter. However, it was agreed to postpone further considerations on this
matter pending the outcome of discussions on related issues in the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
In 1958, a Group of Experts was created to study whether and to what extent
the GATT should include provisions on trade-related competition issues.
Building on the report of the Group of Experts, a Decision on Arrangements
for Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices was adopted in 1960.
The Decision ‘recommends that, at the request of any contracting party, a
contracting party should enter into consultations on Restrictive Business
Practices on a bilateral or a multilateral basis as appropriate...and if it agrees
that such harmful effects are present it should take such measures as it
deems appropriate to eliminate these effects.’ These arrangements have been
invoked on only three occasions, all during 1996, in regard to disputes
submitted by the United States against Japan concerning the Kodak vs. Fuji
case.
The abuse of dominant positions through international price-dumping is
condemned in Article VI of GATT and countries are allowed to introduce
countervailing duties when injured by dumping by foreign firms. Obviously,
the solution proposed by Article VI has a second-best nature, as it does not
tackle the problem directly. This could be corrected with the adoption of an
ICPA.
6
                                                
5  Failure by one contracting party to ratify this change result in continuous inclusion of
Article XXIX in GATT. However, as suggested by Bacchetta et al. (1997), it is not clear
‘whether Members (of the GATT/WTO) are still bound by obligations contained in Chapter
V of the Havana Charter’.
6  Some authors, e.g., Hoekman and Mavroidis (1996), argue that with the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the resulting prohibition of VERs, lobbying for
protection has further shifted towards anti-dumping given the inherent protectionist bias of© EIPA
The inclusion of competition policy rules in GATT was also considered
during the preliminary negotiations for the Uruguay Round, but was later
dismissed in 1986 when launching the Round in Punta del Este.
                                                                                                                           
anti-dumping rules. Vosgereau (1995) argues that the second-best nature of anti-dumping
duties raise a case for an ICPA. However, while in theory an ICPA would be a first-best
choice, its practical relevance depends on the rules and implementation of these rules
within the ICPA. In other words, depending on its design, an ICPA could fail to correct for
the protectionist bias of anti-dumping duties.© EIPA
2.2 Provisions against anti-competitive behaviour in post-Uruguay
Round agreements
As internationalisation of production is progressing worldwide, the WTO
approach differs from the GATT-1947 by focusing on broader and
integrated market access guarantees. This has translated into inclusion of
several provisions concerning private anti-competitive behaviour in the new
WTO agreements. These new agreements are the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS).
All these agreements recognize the need for including provisions against
anti-competitive behaviour. Concerns about private anti-competitive
behaviour in the service sectors seem particularly relevant when noting that
this sector includes telecommunications and financial services which are
characterised by important dominant positions by incumbent firms or
mergers and where contestability of markets is relatively limited because of
large fixed costs. Intellectual property rights have an inherent anti-
competitive nature as they provide monopoly rights to their owners.
Investment abroad, especially Foreign Direct Investment, generally occurs
in imperfectly competitive markets. Thus, the importance of considering
anti-competitive behaviour in all these agreements. However, none of the
agreements goes beyond the recommendation of entering into consultations
whenever anti-competitive business practices may have a serious impact on
competition and thereby restrain trade.
7
Other agreements and articles of GATT  1994 address implicitly or
explicitly the question of anti-competitive behaviour. These include, for
example, the agreement on safeguards, Article xvii of GATT 1994 on state
trading enterprises, the agreement on technical barriers to trade, the
agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the
agreement on preshipment inspection, and the agreement on trade in civil
aircraft. To describe these goes beyond the scope of this paper. The
interested reader can refer to Petersmann (1996) who gives a clear and
detailed lists of provision for anti-competitive behaviour in all these
agreements and articles.
Most authors agree that there exists several holes and loopholes in existing
WTO rules concerning  private anti-competitive behaviour. Take the
                                                
7  This is the case in  article IX:2 of GATS and Article 40 of TRIPS. Article 9 of TRIMS
requires the Council of Trade in Goods to consider the introduction into the agreement of
provisions for competition policy before 1999.© EIPA
following examples. First, the recent Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger
was clearly out of reach of WTO rules and the application of extra-
territoriality clauses may lead to a trade war without an international dispute
settlement mechanism. The second-best nature of anti-dumping duties
provide a second example. The question, however, is not only whether
existing provisions should be seen as sufficient, but whether negotiations for
a multilateral agreement on competition policy can be justified on a cost and
benefit analysis.
In the next section we discuss arguments in favour of an ICPA.
3. ARGUMENTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY AGREEMENT (ICPA)
Several arguments can be put forward in favour of an international approach
towards competition rules. These are discussed in turn below and some
counter arguments are advanced.
First, international trade is distorted by private anti-competitive behaviour.
In this case, some form of transnational competition cooperation may be
necessary to insure that trade agreements are not circumvented by business
practices restricting competition and therefore reducing the gains from trade
liberalisation and market access.
8
Moreover, if restrictive business practices affect trade, then national
competition policies affect rest-of-the-world welfare. If we assume that the
prime objective of competition policy is to prevent departures from
competition (i.e ‘endogenous market distortions’ in Bhagwati’s (1971)
terminology) that would reduce welfare, then national competition
authorities will attempt to maximise national welfare. Under partial
equilibrium, this implies that the focus of a benevolent government is, from
an economic perspective, to prevent ‘market distortion’ whose net effects on
total national consumer and producer surplus are negative. Thus, as
discussed in section 4, it neglects the international externalities associated
with its competition policy, i.e., the effects on rest-of-the-world welfare. To
                                                
8  The beneficial effects of an ICPA may be limited for small countries where a liberal
trade and foreign investment policy may suffice to ensure relatively competitive markets.
Indeed, Singapore and Hong Kong have no national competition policy authorities as they
believe that their open trade and investment policies largely substitute for competition
regulation. Note, however, that small countries may be ‘victims’ of foreign countries laxist
competition policies and therefore support the idea of an ICPA.© EIPA
illustrate this, consider a monopolist which sells all its production abroad or
the common situation of an export cartel. In this case, the national
competition authority (even a social welfare maximising one) has no
incentives to control the potential abuse of dominant position, as all the
costs are borne by foreign consumers (i.e. the negative externality) and all
the ‘benefits’ go to national producers.
This, in turn, may imply that national competition policies can be used in a
strategic way to maximise national welfare at the expense of foreign
countries, much as strategic trade policies does, by backing the market
power of domestic firms. Obviously, such considerations come into play for
instance when the European and US authorities address the Boeing-Airbus
competition issue. The scope for an ICPA in the presence of such spillovers
is discussed in the next section.
9
Second, an ICPA could enhance the credibility of national governments in
their enforcement of an effective competition policy, as trade agreements
may solve the ‘time-inconsistency’ problem
10 with respect to trade policy
decisions. That is, an ICPA could help national government to commit to a
strict application of competition policy when governments face credibility
problems. Note, however, that solving the competition policy credibility
issue through an international agreement is more tricky than with trade, as
the latter inherently has an international dimension that lacks in the former
in the absence of cross-country welfare effects.
Third, it has been sometimes suggested that in a global world where
multinational companies become more predominant, national political
authorities are no longer able to control or simply regulate transnational
economic activities. This current trend is exemplified by the surge of
foreign direct investments and international mergers and acquisitions over
the recent years.
11 The lax or no enforcement of competition principles may
also be favoured by the prospect of attracting foreign companies into the
domestic market. This may in turn trigger a ‘race to the bottom’ between
countries’ competition policies.
                                                
9  The counter-argument is that an ICPA is very likely to raise sovereignty tensions as
well, as countries will have to submit their decisions to supra-national supervision. This is
discussed in section 6.
10  The ‘time-inconsistency’ problem arises when the optimal ex-ante policy is different
from the optimal ex-post policy raising the problem of credibility.
11  During the last ten years, foreign direct investment has increased three times faster than
international trade, while the alue of announced mergers and acquisitions worldwide has
more than tripled.© EIPA
This line of reasoning can be challenged on several grounds. Firstly, a
strong competition authority may provide a healthy environment and
efficiency in factor market which could be seen as a relative comparative
advantage for a host country from the multinational perspective. Thus,
governments willing to attract FDI may instead engage in a ‘race to the top’
with respect to competition policy. Secondly, it is doubtful that
multinational decisions to invest lay on comparative national competition
policy analysis. As multinationals tend to trade worldwide from one
location, they are certainly subject to extra-territoriality clauses. Thus, the
competition rules in the exporting markets may be as relevant (or even
more) than the rules in the country of production. Moreover, the existence
of extra-territoriality clauses implies that a ‘race to the top’ is more likely.
Indeed, multinationals subject to extra-territoriality may prefer to locate in a
country with a strong competition policy, so that decisions by the strong
national authority take into account the changes in their profits (if the firm is
domestically based, its profits enter national welfare), whereas if it is
located in a foreign country, the decision linked to the extra-territoriality
clause will not consider changes in their profits. Finally, it is not clear why
countries should care about multinational competitive behaviour in other
parts of the world as long as this has no influence on national welfare. If it
has some effect, then we are in the presence of policy spillovers which are
to be analysed in the next section.
Fourth, it has been sometimes argued that the laxist Japanese anti-trust law
has allowed Japanese firms to benefit from higher monopolist profits which
could be invested in research and development (R&D), hence ‘artificially’
boosting their relative competitiveness. An harmonisation of international
competition rules could prevent such behaviour. However, if monopolistic
rents are invested in R&D which allow for future price falls, quality
improvement and increased diversity, then competition policy authorities
should maximise welfare inter-temporally before taking any decision.
Fifth, an international harmonisation of competition rules will lead to a
reduction in transaction costs for firms. The coexistence of numerous,
sometimes conflicting, national competition rules entails private cost in
terms of information, requirement and uncertainty. At present, an
international merger has to comply to the competition rules of each country
of origin (and possibly of activity) of the merger parties. The issue, then, is
whether transaction costs are high enough to give scope for an international
agreement which also involves significant costs. Indeed, not only
negotiation costs may be high (recall that the Uruguay Round lasted eight
years), but also the dispute settlement mechanism at the international level
may involve higher costs than at the national level. Thus, more empirical
work is needed before concluding on the potential gains from an ICPA© EIPA
based on the reduction of transaction costs. Besides, differences in
competition policy rules may just reflect differences in preferences across
countries. This, through the effects on relative prices, certainly makes trade
more attractive, which in turn maximises world welfare while respecting
countries preferences. Harmonisation of rules not only neglects country
preferences but reduces the scope for beneficial trade.
12
The above arguments suggest that the only convincing case for an ICPA
boils down to the presence of competition policy spillovers.
13 Arguably,
cross-border externalities may be internalised by unilateral or bilateral
extension of national jurisdiction to foreign countries. However, the extra-
territorial reach of a national competition policy may generate sovereignty
tensions which jeopardise the globalised world. Thus, as discussed in the
next section, to internalise such cross-country welfare effects it may be
necessary to adopt an international perspective.
4. COMPETITION POLICY SPILLOVERS: A CASE FOR AN
ICPA?
The existence of anti-competitive behaviour does not justify in itself the
need for an ICPA.
14 A necessary condition (though not sufficient) to justify
the creation of an ICPA is the existence of spillovers (i.e., cross-border
externalities): that is, restrictive business practices in one country affect
agents (consumers, firms) in other countries. This condition is certainly
fulfilled in the case of export cartels. In theory, this necessary condition is
almost always fulfilled. Indeed, even in the case of a national competition
policy decision in a non-tradeable sector in country A, there may be effects
on consumers or firms in country B, through general equilibrium effects in
country A (such as production and factor price adjustments which may
affect international markets). In practice, however, these indirect effects are
likely to be relatively small. More direct effects could be of larger concern.
In general, policy spillovers may be larger when national competition policy
decisions are taken in sectors which trade a large share of their production.
                                                
12  See Krugman (1997) for a similar line of reasoning with respect to environment and
labour standards. Note also that, as argued by Bacchetta et al (1997), harmonisation of trade
policies do not solve the competition policy spillover  dilemma. Indeed, two countries may
have identical competition policy rules but may still hurt a trading partner's interest through
policy spillovers as rest-of-the-world welfare is not considered by the national competition
policy authority.
13  Gatsios and Seabright (1989) and Neven (1992) previously argued that policy spillovers
are the key issue in deciding which policies should be subject to international negotiation or
assigned to the top-tier in a multi-level governmental structure.
14  This section draws largely on Bacchetta, Horn and Mavroidis (1997).© EIPA
However, the fact that national competition policy decisions may affect
international markets does not necessarily imply that an ICPA is required to
account for the interests of consumers and producers in other countries.
Indeed, as long as the national competition policy decision does not change
when taking into account the rest-of-the-world interests, policy spillovers do
not justify an ICPA. Clearly, if the decision taken by the national authority
is the same as the one that would have been taken by a international
authority within an ICPA, then there is no justification to create such an
agreement. This type of situation arises whenever the domestic gains related
to the national competition policy authority decision are larger than the
neglected spillovers to foreign firms and consumers. In such a case,
internalising the spillovers through an ICPA would not change the decision
of the national authority given that world welfare increases (i.e., the increase
in national welfare is larger than the fall in rest-of-the-world welfare). Note
that the fact that internalisation of an externality does not affect the optimal
decision is due to the fact that competition policy decision are often discrete
choices, as for example, allow or not a merger. If the competition policy
decision were a continuous variable, then the international optimal decision
would be different from the national optimal decision.
Then, an ICPA would be justified in the presence of a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’,
that is whenever the optimal choice that each rational agent takes
individually differs from the choice that is taken when individuals cooperate
and if the cooperative choice implies a higher payoff for all agents than the
payoff in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
To summarise, spillovers from nationally-pursued competition policies
provide a case for an ICPA only to the extent that the spillovers are
sufficiently large to change the decision taken by a national authority and
that there are welfare gains for the world when this decision is taken within
an ICPA.
5. PRO- AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE SPILLOVERS
Spillovers can have different effects on competition: they could either
enhance competition, i.e., be  pro-competitive, or reduce it, i.e., be anti-
competitive.© EIPA
Spillovers are anti-competitive when, for instance, a national competition
authority allows a merger between two domestic firms that sell a large share
of their output in foreign markets.
15 The national competition authority does
not take into account foreign consumers’ interests in its decision to allow
the merger. The price increase in foreign markets that may result from the
merger, and the resulting loss for foreign consumers, is of no concern to the
national authority.
16 However, had an international authority taken the
decision, foreign consumers’ interests would have been considered and the
merger may have been forbidden. Clearly, in this case, the spillovers are
anti-competitive as the national authority takes a more laxist attitude
towards anti-competitive behaviour.
Pro-competitive spillovers exist when, for example, the national competition
policy authority does not allow a merger between two domestic firms that
compete in the national market only with foreign firms. The national
authority refuses the merger because of the presumed price increase that
would hurt national consumers interests by more than the increase in the
merged firms profits. However, under a large set of circumstances,
17 the
foreign firms would benefit from the domestic merger. This is the case if the
final domestic price is higher after the merger and if the two merged firms
sufficiently internalise their strategic interaction, so that they restrict their
total market share.
18 The international authority which will include foreign
firms’ profits in its objective function may decide to allow the merger if the
increase in foreign firms profits outweighs the fall in national welfare.
19
Thus, spillovers in this case are clearly pro-competitive as their elimination
through internalisation in an ICPA will lead to a less competitive trading
system.
Hence, spillovers could be pro-competitive or anti-competitive and their
internalisation through an ICPA may lead to a more or a less competitive
world. Therefore, the creation of an international competition policy
authority is not unambiguously conducive to a more competitive world.
Moreover, if it is generally possible to identify situations where spillovers
exist, it may be extremely difficult to conclude a priori whether the
spillovers are pro- or anti-competitive. For instance, consider the case of
pro-competitive spillovers discussed above. If we had assumed instead that
efficiency gains (i.e., cost reductions) from the merger were sufficiently
                                                
15  The level of competition in this example depends on the number of firms operating in
the world market. Competition increases with the number of firms.
16 Note that this holds regardless of whether markets are segmented or integrated.
17 See  Salant  et al. (1983) for the conditions under Cournot behaviour and Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) for Bertrand competition.
18  Recall that in oligopolistic markets the perceived marginal revenue for a given firm is
above its true marginal revenue.
19  A similar result is obtained by Barros and Cabral (1994), though in a different context.© EIPA
large to decrease the domestic price, then foreign firms’ profits would have
fallen. In this case, spillovers would have been anti-competitive since the
merger might have been accepted by the national authority but refused by
the international authority once foreign firms’ profits are accounted for. To
summarise, whether the ICPA would have pro- or anti-competitive effects
on the world trading system remains an open question.
20 So far, we have
assumed that competition authorities seek to maximise social welfare in a
direct way. However, they may have different objective functions.
Competition policy authorities may be subject to lobbying. In this case, its
objective function will also differ from social welfare maximisation as
discussed in the next section.
6. ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION OF COMPETITION
POLICY AND WORLD WELFARE
Competition policy, as any redistributive policy, is subject to lobbying by
industry groups which may try to influence the competition authority’s
decision in their favour.
21 Assume that, as in the endogenous trade policy
literature, this translates into a higher weight put on producer surplus (i.e.,
firms’ profits) in the competition authority’s objective than on consumer
surplus.
22 Thus, producers’ interests are over-represented in the decision
process.
Consider the same setup as in the discussion of pro-competitive spillovers in
the previous section, taking into account that both the national and the
international competition policy authority are subject to industry lobbying.
23
Then, both authorities will be more likely to accept the merger, as firms’
profits increase in this case. For the sake of illustration, consider the case
where both national and world welfare would fall following the merger
(which would have implied with a benevolent government as in the previous
section that both the national and international authorities would have
rejected the merger). In spite of industry lobbying by national firms, it is
                                                
20  This may recall the discussion over the pro or anti-competitive effects of anti-dumping
rules (see Hoekman and Mavroidis (1996) for an illustration).
21  To illustrate this, let us quote Hans Krakauer, senior vice president of the International
Airline Passengers Association, on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas and European
Commission struggle in Summer 1997: ‘What you've got here is a power play, and anyone
who says it’s being done in the interest of passengers is a liar’ (Wall Street Journal, 23 July
1997).
22  For a recent formal justification of this result with microeconomics basis in the context
of trade policy, see e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1994).
23  Note that the same logic applies to anti-competitive spillovers, and perhaps surprisingly
to the case of positive spillovers.© EIPA
possible that the national authority still refuses the merger. It may be the
case, however, that the international competition authority which is subject
to industry lobbying by both national and foreign firms accepts the merger
since foreign firms’ profits, which increase with the merger, are over-
represented in its objective function.
In such a situation, the authorisation of the merger by the international
authority does not only decrease the level of competition, as the merger is
allowed and price-markups increase, but it also decreases national and world
welfare. Note that these are potential risks, rather than likely outcomes, as
this depends on the institutional setting prevailing in the decision-making
process.
7. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS: AN ICPA IN THE WTO?
The desirability of an ICPA also rests on the institutional form that would be
adopted. It is sometimes suggested that an agreement in the WTO may
consist of a minimum set of competition policies to be introduced in each
member country and which would be regulated by a national authority.
Though desirable in itself, as it may improve institutional aspects in
developing countries, this would not address  the main rationale identified in
sections 3 and 4 for an agreement, i.e. the presence of competition policy
spillovers. To solve this some form of coordination mechanism should be
implemented. In this section we outline factors that may prevent the
coordination of national competition policies within the existing WTO
framework.
An important issue is the question of sovereignty. An overseeing body
responsible for competition policy (within the WTO) would automatically
imply some abandon of sovereignty from the part of national authorities (to
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for example). Although many
countries may find it in their interest to coordinate competition policies in
the presence of spillovers, they may not be willing to delegate their
authority to an international agency. This problem is further heightened by
the fact that contrary to other economic policies, such as tariff barriers for
instance, deviation from the rules cannot be assessed in a general way. With
anti-competitive behaviour each case has to be assessed individually. Hence,
to be efficient, an international cooperation on competition policy has to
involve a significant  delegation of national sovereignty over competition
rules and implementation.© EIPA
Second, because of national and cultural differences regarding the
appropriate characterisation of competition policy, international
coordination may prove to be very tedious, and more importantly, very
costly. At the initial stage, high negotiating costs are to be expected since
long negotiations involving a significant amount of bargaining among
negotiating partners will probably be required to reach an international
agreement. Moreover, the setting of international competition rules is
doomed to attract fierce lobbying activities, in particular from the large
companies and industries, in order to influence the design and
implementation of competition policies, thus further increasing the social
costs of negotiating an agreement.
24
Third, an agreement on the set of competition rules that should be adopted is
likely to prove controversial. One of the major dilemmas concerns the
constraints imposed by international competition rules: should they be
binding or not?  And if they are, what should be the enforcement
mechanism? Another similar dilemma rests on the nature of international
competition laws. On the one hand, rules per se would provide a very clear
framework, removing most of the uncertainty associated with competition
decisions. The drawback, however, would be the arbitrary nature of such
competition rules reinforced by the absence of consensus on competition
standards. Moreover, rules per se lack flexibility, and therefore may result
in the condemnation of very efficient practices. On the other hand, an
international competition law based on the rule of reason could be adopted.
This would have the advantage of providing a greater flexibility in assessing
anti-competitive behaviour, albeit at the cost of greater uncertainty. That is,
although general rules per se can be set as guidelines, each case must be
judged on its own merit, which implies some scope for rule of reason.
The implication of a more discretionary ruling, apart from greater
uncertainty, is that it would require some forms of judicial process.
Obviously, this could become problematic at the international level since it
would require an international authority. The question of whether the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism is the right place arises. The resources that
such an approach would require are very likely to overtake WTO capacities.
The cases raised to the dispute settlement mechanism risk to be much more
tedious and complex than the ones concerning trade issues. As a
comparison, Blackhurst (1996) notes that the International Court of Justice
in The Hague, which heard an average of two cases a year, has a budget and
                                                
24  Other negotiations, such as in agriculture, may also be subject to high negotiating costs.
The main difference is that  gains from an agreement on the liberalization of agriculture
markets have been already quantified whereas those from an ICPA still need to be
identified and quantified.© EIPA
staff which is almost three times the budget and staff of the Legal Affairs
Division of the WTO.
Fourth, international cooperation on competition could be plagued by
information problems. In particular, investigations on anti-competitive
behaviour often involve the communication to competition authorities of
confidential information. A firm in one country may then be very reluctant
to disclose sensitive information regarding its economic activities to a
foreign or international competition authority (see for instance, Van Miert,
1996). Besides, due to high information costs, it is arguably preferable to
implement competition policies in the most decentralised way (i.e., at the
national level), rather than by a central, remote international trade
authority.
25
Fifth, if the ICPA is going to be negotiated within the WTO and related to
trade issues, negotiators should be careful not to introduce a protectionist
bias in the agreement. Indeed, it is well recognised by economists that
Article VI of GATT concerning international dumping has  a protectionist
bias and this may extend to an agreement on competition policy if not
carefully elaborated. As other forms of trade protection tend to be banned by
GATT, industries may request their governments to protect their domestic
market based on competition policy agreements.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Claims for the need for an International Competition Policy Agreement
(ICPA) are often raised. This paper takes a cost-benefit approach in
assessing it. Thus,  the existence of potential benefits from such an
agreement in the presence of cross-border competition policy spillovers that
lead to a ‘prisoners dilemma’ situation must be balanced against the risks
that may emerge from the hasty adoption of an agreement that may be
subject to capture.
In particular, this paper shows that an ICPA can potentially lead to both a
less competitive world trading system and, more importantly, a lower level
of world welfare. The nature of the impact of an ICPA depends on the
                                                
25 This may explain why the EU has adopted the principle of subsidiarity in its
competition policy: member states are responsible for competition policy unless it concerns
practices that distort competition in the common market (and not simply in one member
state).© EIPA
objective pursued by national and international competition authorities and
the influence of specific interest groups in the design and implementation of
competition policies.
Concerning the creation of an ICPA within the WTO framework, this
process could entail long and tedious negotiations and may not fulfil
expectations. An agreement on a minimum set of competition rules for
member countries (as suggested by the EU and to some extent by the US),
while desirable for institutional reasons, does not correct for the main
rationale for an international agreement discussed in section 4, i.e
competition policy spillovers. On the other hand, if the agreement tries to
solve the spillover problem by introducing some sort of supra-national
authority or inter-government cooperation, it is yet not clear from a
cost/benefit perspective that this is worth pursuing (especially if supra-
national authorities are subject to capture). Further study on the costs and
benefits from such an agreement is needed. Moreover, if the ICPA is going
to be related to trade issues within the WTO, negotiators should be careful
not to introduce a protectionist bias in the agreement.© EIPA
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